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Lebanon is a multisectarian state in which Muslim and Christian groups share political power. The executive elite is composed 
of a Maronite president, a Shiite speaker 
of parliament and a Sunni prime minis-
ter. The legislature is split 50-50 between 
Muslims and Christians, and communities 
enjoy educational and religious autonomy. 
Two pacts act as regulatory frameworks 
for these political arrangements: the 1943 
National Pact and the 1989 Taif agreement, 
which put a halt to Lebanon’s 15-year civil 
war (1975-90). 
 While Lebanon’s prewar political 
system (1943-75) was often framed as a 
paradigmatic case of consociational or 
power-sharing democracy,1 most observers 
today agree that this system is an anarchis-
tic model for the devolution of power. 2 
Sectarian3 politics feeds on patronage ties 
and foreign alliances through which com-
munities vie for control over resources. 
It further reifies partisanship in external 
conflicts.
 One important factor that has con-
tributed to the derailment of the Lebanese 
model is its rigid institutionalization, 
which makes the quota system unre-
sponsive to social change.4 Moreover, 
the sectarian divisions entrenched in the 
system invite external involvement. Post-
war Lebanon was under the tutelage of its 
Syrian neighbor until 2005. The latter’s 
hegemonic role was justified on the basis 
that Lebanon needed an “arbitrator” to 
regulate its centrifugal nationalism. Vari-
ous crises have since then tested the limits 
of Lebanon’s postwar system. By 2004, 
Syria’s role in Lebanese politics had led to 
mounting tensions between anti-Syrian and 
pro-Syrian factions. Following Prime Min-
ister Rafiq Hariri’s slaying in 2005, a series 
of protests culminated in the departure of 
the Syrian troops. 
 Still, polarization between the anti-
Syrian and pro-Syrian groups — called the 
March 14 and March 8 Alliances, respec-
tively — has blocked reform. Since 2005, 
Lebanon’s competing political coalitions 
have dueled for dominance, and contention 
over core policy matters has thrown the 
country into episodic deadlock. Though 
both coalitions are multisectarian, their 
prescriptions for state building clash. The 
March 14 Alliance, perceived as closer to 
the Western world, calls for dismantling 
the military wing of the Shiite party Hez-
bollah, insisting that the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) — convened to prose-
cute the perpetrators of Hariri’s slaying — 
continue its course, despite initial findings 
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the March 8 and March 14 coalitions. At 
the heart of this fracture is the struggle for 
predominance over the Lebanese state.
EU POLICY FRAME POST-2011 
 The EU’s policy framework in Leba-
non has been articulated through the prism 
of the 2002 Association Agreement and 
the 2006 European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP) Action Plan. National Indicative 
Programs (NIP) lay out the scope of EU 
funding, and progress reports appraise 
their effectiveness.6 Whereas Lebanon’s 
Association Agreement under the Barce-
lona process has been criticized for being 
vague in its support for political reform, 
the ENP Action Plan, divided into three 
tracks, has sought to address this gap, 
albeit with limited success.7 The first 
track, centering on political reform, aims 
to strengthen institutions, human rights 
and civil-society organizations (CSOs), 
while the socioeconomic track promotes 
reforms in Lebanon’s market economy and 
educational sector. The third, dedicated to 
stabilization initiatives, deals with issues 
relating to infrastructure, decentralization 
and Palestinian refugee camps. 
 Instruments tailored to empower 
CSOs, such as the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights, comple-
ment the ENP’s overarching approach. 
The EU delegation in Lebanon, part of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
created in 2009 to establish a more coher-
ent EU foreign policy, coordinates political 
dialogue between the EU and the Lebanese 
government. 
 While the Arab uprisings represented 
an opportunity for the EU to reevaluate its 
role in the region, Lebanon has been only 
marginally integrated into key policy docu-
ments, reflecting the EU’s discursive shift 
towards “a new neighborhood.” 8 
that indictments would implicate Hezbol-
lah members. Conversely, the March 8 Al-
liance, led by Hezbollah, seeks closer ties 
with the Syrian regime while asserting that 
Hezbollah’s military arsenal is a strategic 
necessity and that the STL is nothing more 
than a politicized instrument.
 While Lebanon can be said to have 
stood by as it observed the early contagion 
of the Arab uprisings, the Bashar al-Assad 
regime’s crackdown in Syria constituted 
a critical juncture for the country. Since 
then, the small polity has increasingly 
incurred backlash effects from the Syr-
ian crisis. The policy of dissociation that 
the Lebanese state has embraced vis-à-vis 
the Syrian uprising has been ineffective. 
Hezbollah’s longstanding alliance with 
the Syrian regime prompted its engage-
ment in the fighting, and the polarization 
of sectarian elites over the “Syrian ques-
tion” has trickled down to their communi-
ties. Clashes between anti-Syrian Sunnis 
and Shiite-backed pro-Syrian Alawites in 
northern Lebanon are indicative of broader 
tensions simmering at the heart of the 
Lebanese sectarian patchwork. While the 
Shiites, broadly speaking, support the Syr-
ian regime, the Sunnis are sympathetic to 
the uprising. Christians and Druze remain 
divided on the Syrian crisis. 
 Lebanese political divisions over Syria 
reflect competition for future political gains, 
as the shape of politics in Syria has broad 
ramifications for the balance of power in 
Lebanon.5 The country’s deteriorating secu-
rity situation and the breakdown of elite ac-
commodation resulted in the postponement 
of the 2013 parliamentary elections, and 
two different governments have resigned 
since the start of the Arab revolution-
ary wave. Polarization over the STL, the 
drafting of an electoral law, and the Syrian 
uprising have deepened the split between 
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social disparities and includes a section on 
fostering dialogue and cross-cutting ties 
within Lebanese communities. 
THE SECTARIAN MODEL 
 The EU-Lebanon Action Plan has had 
a mixed track record.11 Lebanon has been 
called a “passive and superficial partner,” 
because of its inability to live up to ENP 
commitments due to security concerns,12 
and the EU’s engagement there has been 
depicted as both lacking political leverage 
and grounded in ambiguity.13 Gaining in-
sight into the dilemmas that make Lebanon 
a challenging case for the EU’s Democracy 
Assistance (DA) policy requires more 
than a cursory analysis of the instruments 
employed. The issue can better be eluci-
dated by assessing the quality of the match 
between the EU’s normative approach 
to reform in Lebanon and the country’s 
political and sectarian dynamics, as well 
as through an exploration of how the EU, 
as an international actor, interacts with the 
prevailing balance of power there.
The EU’s Approach and Lebanon’s 
Sectarian Politics
 The EU strategy of trying to spur po-
litical reform in Lebanon through funding 
and policy linkages was left intact through 
the Arab uprisings. Its approach can be 
described as institutionalist,14 rooted in a 
liberal approach to democratization across 
the broader Arab world.15 This concept of 
democratization, rebaptized in the wake of 
the Arab revolts as the building of “deep 
democracies,” emphasizes criteria beyond 
free and fair elections, extending to the pro-
motion of an independent judiciary and the 
strengthening of civil and political rights. 
The EU approach to reform in Lebanon 
has been based on funding electoral initia-
tives as well as strengthening the judiciary 
 Understandably, Lebanon has trig-
gered only minor policy interest, given 
that it was no Arab Spring front-runner. 
Its centrality to discussions related to the 
uprisings and EU policy mechanisms 
was, however, brought to the fore as three 
outcomes of the upheavals have backfired 
on its territory. First, Lebanon hosts the 
largest number of Syrian refugees. Second, 
it is slowly developing into a proxy battle-
field for the Syrian regime’s crackdown 
on its rebels. Third, its sectarian conflict 
lines now intersect with broader confron-
tations between Shia and Sunnis. This 
rivalry opposing Sunnis and Shia reflects 
the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
and their respective allies over regional 
dominance.9
 A look at the allocation of EU fund-
ing in post-2011 Lebanon reveals that 
crisis management and stability have been 
key. The largest chunk of EU funding, 
amounting in 2013 to €222.8 million, is 
earmarked for the response towards the 
Syrian refugee crisis on Lebanese soil. 
Notwithstanding this, new instruments 
like the Spring Initiative, intended to 
strengthen democracy and reduce social 
inequities following the revolts, have also 
targeted Lebanon.10 In 2012 and 2013, 
€45 million were allocated for the support 
of electoral reforms and an independent 
judiciary, as well as for the improvement 
of human rights and security. Lebanon has 
further benefited from the recently cre-
ated European Endowment for Democracy 
(EED), which supports CSOs.
 In line with the EU’s new approach to 
the Arab world is the 2013-15 ENP Action 
Plan for Lebanon, unpublished at the time 
of this writing. On the one hand, it priori-
tizes institutional reform, human rights 
and the empowerment of civil society. On 
the other, it dedicates attention to mending 
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return for a community’s allegiance, is the 
main vector through which they entrench 
their predominance. 
 Moreover, since the end of the 1975-
90 civil war, contentious issues have pri-
marily been tackled through informal elite 
coalitions rather than institutional politics 
as platforms of deliberation. The Syrian-
Lebanese security regime from 1990 until 
2005, and 
Lebanon’s 
executive rul-
ing coalition 
in the 1990s, 
which was 
criticized for 
undermining 
institutions, 
are illustra-
tive of this. 
Since 2006, the National Dialogue Com-
mittee, a noninstitutionalized platform 
composed of Lebanon’s main sectarian 
leaders, has evolved into the core arena 
where thorny issues are tackled. 21 
 Whereas the ENP policy framework 
emphasizes an institutionalist approach, 
the EU, in practice, acquiesces to Leba-
non’s informal political spheres and adopts 
a pragmatic approach to its mode of 
politics. It encourages the resumption of 
the noninstitutionalized National Dialogue 
process,22 even though the latter has not 
had any policymaking impact since 2006. 
Despite the Lebanese parliament’s uncon-
stitutional move to reelect its members in 
early 2013, the European parliament has 
maintained dialogue with its Lebanese 
counterpart.
 An additional structural dilemma cast-
ing a pall over the EU’s approach is what 
Clark and Salloukh have termed the “re-
cursive relation” between sectarian elites 
and CSOs.23 Sectarian elites extend their 
and parliament. The recently renegotiated 
Action Plan sets electoral reform, includ-
ing the alignment of the electoral law with 
international norms, as a key priority.16
 The broadly framed approach that 
the EU promotes with regard to political 
transition in Lebanon17 remains too remote 
from Lebanon’s “deeply rooted communal-
ism.”18 In its declaratory strategy, the EU 
evades the 
burning issue 
at the core of 
Lebanon’s de-
mocratization 
process: the 
completion 
of a transi-
tion away 
from sectar-
ian power-
sharing, as set out as a longer-term goal 
in the Taif accords of 1989. Further, in an 
attempt to fit its approach in Lebanon into 
its broader response to the Arab world 
after the revolts, the 2011 ENP progress 
report maintains the importance of promot-
ing a “deep and sustainable democracy” 
in Lebanon.19 However, it does little to 
expand on how such a conception of de-
mocracy is to be understood in relation to 
Lebanon’s power-sharing model, in which 
democratization is inherently linked to the 
pact of accommodation between political 
communities rather than to a benchmark of 
elections.
 While the EU’s DA program is tilted 
towards strengthening institutions and civ-
il-society organizations, the core of politi-
cal power and decision making in Lebanon 
lies in extrainstitutional and nonformalized 
political spheres. Lebanon’s sectarian elites 
monopolize effective power to the detri-
ment of the country’s formal institutions.20 
Clientelism, the provision of services in 
Lebanon’s sectarian elites monopolize 
effective power to the detriment of the 
country’s formal institutions. Clientelism, 
the provision of services in return for 
a community’s allegiance, is the main 
vector through which they entrench their 
predominance.
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discursive framework — is lacking in 
Lebanon. At the heart of this discrepancy 
lies the dilemma of bolder engagement in 
Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing. 
 On a normative level, the EU has 
highlighted the need for a “national pact” 
as a prerequisite to political reforms.26 In 
practice, however, it has avoided the issue, 
opting for a pragmatic engagement with 
Lebanon’s political realities.27 The EU has 
avoided any politics of conditionality28 that 
might condemn the breakdown of power-
sharing governments throughout episodic 
instances of political stalemate. Tocci has, 
for instance, noted the EU’s silence when 
Hezbollah walked out on the Lebanese gov-
ernment in 2006.29 Following the cycles of 
governmental collapse that have taken place 
since the onset of the Arab uprisings, the 
EU has at best remained “an observer.”30
 The EU agenda for electoral reform 
is at the core of its normative approach 
to Lebanon, but in this field as well it 
has avoided conditionality.31 The stalled 
2013 elections are a case in point. The EU 
simply expressed regret at Lebanon’s deci-
sion to delay its 2013 elections and urged 
Lebanese parties to use the parliament’s 
extended mandate to agree on a new elec-
toral law.32 Dialogue with the March 8 and 
March 14 factions has been an iterative 
process for negotiating the lack of compli-
ance with the ENP’s declared goals. 
 The EU’s reticence to forge a line of 
political conditionality in a divided society 
such as Lebanon’s has complex underpin-
nings. While the EU fears that external 
manipulation may widen domestic cleav-
ages,33 it has remained a realistic actor 
more interested in stability than in conflict-
prone democratization processes.34 
 Some have questioned whether the 
EU’s depoliticized aid policy helps en-
trench the status quo in Lebanon35 and 
clientelistic networks into CSOs, vitiating 
their power to alter the system while CSOs 
improve their status through sectarian poli-
tics. While Lebanese civil society remains 
active, a sharp gap between Lebanon’s 
political and civil societies prevails. Elite 
control over decision making through 
informal bargaining methods prevents 
CSOs from challenging the establishment 
through institutional avenues. 
 Against this backdrop, one impor-
tant question is how much EU aid policy 
vis-à-vis CSOs deals with this “recursive 
relation.” Indeed, the relationship between 
elites and CSOs weakens the link between 
CSO empowerment and democratization, 
inhibiting the effectiveness of the aid in the 
first place. This gap has already been noted 
in Khatib’s study on Lebanese perceptions 
of the EU’s DA program. The EU has been 
asked to work beyond financial assistance 
in encouraging the Lebanese establishment 
to better respond to civil society.24
 In the context of this recursive rela-
tion in which CSOs and sectarian elites 
share benefits, two compelling questions 
arise: (1) does the EU practice an effective 
politics of differentiation between grass-
roots actors that may challenge political 
leadership and CSOs penetrated by sectar-
ian logic, and (2) does EU aid reach less 
visible social movements? Indeed, those 
local NGOs that gained exposure to the 
donor community through connections to 
the political establishment not only enjoy 
more visibility; they have also acquired the 
skills necessary to respond to EU calls for 
proposals.25 
Discrepancy between Rhetoric and 
Implementation 
 Policy coherence on the part of the 
EU — that is, the extent to which policy 
implementation is harmonized within a 
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undermines its credibility as an agent of 
change.36 There are yet benefits to the 
EU’s delinking of aid from more coercive 
politics. First, it offers the cover of neutral-
ity necessary to keep important avenues of 
dialogue and public diplomacy open.37 One 
notable example is how the EU has main-
tained its calls for electoral reform since 
2005, despite Hezbollah’s role as a major 
stakeholder in the Lebanese elections.38 
 Although the EU would like to main-
tain a soft approach to Lebanon’s sectarian 
politics, its management of tensions during 
critical junctures may exacerbate internal 
rifts. That EU foreign policy is actually 
articulated though the individual policy 
of its member states has long been estab-
lished. The EU was, for example, slow to 
react to the 2006 war between Hezbollah 
and Israel due to the clashing views of 
its member states on conflict regulation. 
Moreover, the EU has not fared well as 
a “force for good”39 in Lebanon’s frag-
mented structure. The actions of the EU 
and its member states in an international 
setting often have internal implications for 
Lebanon’s balance of power. The EU has 
supported the Hariri tribunal, one of the 
most divisive issues between the March 8 
and March 14 Alliances that brought about 
the collapse of the government in January 
2011. Further, France’s backing of UN Se-
curity Council (UNSC) Resolution 1559 in 
2004, which called for the demilitarization 
of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of Syrian 
troops from Lebanese soil, fueled rifts 
between the anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian 
groups prior to Hariri’s slaying. 
 It is worth noting that, because Leba-
non’s political system entrenches divisions 
along sectarian lines, it invites actors to 
seek external allies and funding to protect 
their interests. The EU member states have 
historically been enmeshed in such interac-
tions. One need only look to the histori-
cal rapprochement between the Lebanese 
Maronites and France and between the 
Druze and Britain for examples. 40 In their 
struggle for predominance, Lebanon’s poli-
cy makers have capitalized on cooperation 
with the EU to bolster their positions. Hol-
lis notes that the government that upheld 
Lebanon’s ENP Action Plan in 2007 was 
the pro-Western Fouad Siniora govern-
ment, eager to rally behind its European al-
lies to weaken the pro-Syrian opposition.41 
Tensions in the EU Approach
 An additional dilemma posing a chal-
lenge for EU engagement is the tension 
between security and reform. This debate 
is an old one. The EU’s policy framework 
in Lebanon cannot be detatched from 
its internal-security agenda.42 With the 
instability wrought by the Arab uprisings, 
the EU faces a trade-off between pushing 
through its DA agenda and prioritizing se-
curity imperatives that constrain deepening 
democratic politics. The EU stance to-
wards Hezbollah and its role in managing 
the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon are 
key examples of how democracy promo-
tion can be subordinated to security and 
stability concerns. 
 The EU has come to realize that it can 
no longer marginalize Islamists in its sup-
port for political transitions, but Hezbollah 
presents a tough case. It is part and parcel 
of Lebanon’s power-sharing machinery, 
but still maintains a military wing with a 
regional agenda. After blacklisting Hezbol-
lah’s military wing for its suspected in-
volvement in bombings of Jewish tourists 
in Bulgaria, the EU slammed Hezbollah’s 
involvement in the Syrian civil war in June 
2013.43 Support for sanctions on the part of 
EU member states has grown with Hezbol-
lah’s role in the Syrian war. 44 
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institutionalization of sectarianism through 
power-sharing thwarts the very conception 
of the liberal democracy it seeks to ad-
vance. At best, the EU hopes that advocat-
ing for proportionality in elections and an 
independent judiciary, as well as empower-
ing CSOs, might have spillover effects that 
could benefit de-sectarianization.47 
 One substantial weakness in the EU 
approach to a divided society such as 
Lebanon’s is that it has so far treated 
democratization and power-sharing as 
two separate tracks.48 While its DA plan 
overemphasizes elections as a driver 
for deepening democratic processes in 
Lebanon,49 the latter has been thwarted by 
“adversarial decision-making.”50 Antago-
nism among Lebanon’s elites, which feeds 
on deeper existential fears and patronage 
networks, precludes the very consensus 
needed to uphold an electoral democracy. 
It is worth debating whether the EU’s aid 
policy would be more effective if it were 
more conditional on a prerequisite of na-
tional reconciliation.51 
 Recent scholarship has attracted at-
tention to the tradeoffs that power-sharing 
imposes on democratization in divided so-
cieties and has called for a policy approach 
synchronizing peace-building and democ-
ratization initiatives. 52 In this context, can 
the EU adopt a conceptual lens other than 
procedural criteria of democratization for 
its engagement in Lebanon? One comple-
mentary pathway for the EU in Lebanon 
in particular merits further study. Given 
that regional conflicts derail Lebanon’s 
elite coalescence and exacerbate sectar-
ian loyalties,53 some scholars argue for 
insulating Lebanon from external strains 
through a policy of “careful” alignment.54 
This kind of strategy need not be specific 
to Lebanon; divided societies fare best in 
non-intrusive environments. 
 While the EU has pledged to work 
with any Lebanese government, even one 
including Hezbollah,45 it remains to be 
seen whether the EU will attempt to use 
stronger conditionality to extricate Hezbol-
lah from further entanglement in Syria. In 
this view, Lebanon represents a trump card 
for the EU through which it could have 
leverage over some of the external play-
ers in the Syrian crisis. It is thus difficult 
to conceive that the EU’s broader security 
agenda would not impinge on the politics 
of inclusiveness it claims to pursue. Prior 
analysis in fact reveals that it has been 
ambivalent with regard to Hezbollah’s 
two-faced power.46
 The EU role in helping the Lebanese 
state manage the crisis provoked by the 
influx of displaced persons from Syria 
highlights the primacy it places on main-
taining stability. Since 2011, the EU has 
prioritized a cooperative relationship with 
the Lebanese government in spite of epi-
sodic breakdowns in the democratic pro-
cess, partly because it sees it as necessary 
to the proper management of the refugee 
crisis. In doing so, it has refrained from 
exercising a politics of conditionality to 
ensure compliance with suggested reforms. 
Indeed, the EU’s aid policy in the Syrian 
refugee crisis cannot be separated from its 
role as a regional migration regime seeking 
to manage the human flow in the Euro-
Mediterranean zone. 
EU ROLE IN POWER-SHARING
 Due to the dilemmas discussed above, 
the EU can scarcely hope to wield any 
real influence in Lebanese politics. By 
prioritizing procedural criteria it fails to 
target the nonformalized nature of sectar-
ian power and the social logic through 
which it is reproduced. It further fails to 
address the more delicate issue of how the 
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 The EU may be able to draw on its 
identity as a regional actor to boost net-
works supportive of peace building in 
Lebanon, and this possibility merits further 
research. As the Northern Ireland case 
shows, positive external pressures have 
been crucial to power-sharing.55 Even 
though the EU was not a main player in 
Northern Ireland’s political arrangements, 
it did provide a platform for key external 
stakeholders — the British and the Irish — 
to cooperate on the Belfast issue.56 
 Although the EU’s potential to of-
fer a “benign external environment”57 is 
primarily effective in countries that either 
enjoy EU membership or are involved in 
accession negotiations, its experience in 
that field may inform the debate on ways 
to back democratization initiatives with a 
conflict-resolution track in Lebanon. The 
EU has formally supported Lebanon’s 
stance of dissociation vis-à-vis the Syrian 
crisis, but it could do more in practice to 
enhance Lebanon’s capacity to uphold the 
policy. It could provide a broader arena for 
embedding policy networks sympathetic 
to Lebanon’s politics of neutrality58 into 
a larger sphere of dialogue.59 Concretely, 
this means convening regional consulta-
tive processes on how to reduce external 
pressure on the Lebanese political system. 
These fora could address the issue of how 
the backlash effects of the Arab uprisings, 
in particular, continue to feed conflict and 
stalemate in Lebanon.
 I would also urge policy makers to re-
visit the question of whether, and how, the 
EU’s DA plan could be fine-tuned to Leba-
non’s specificities, particularly the issue 
of elite accommodation and its impact on 
democratization. There is likely potential 
for socialization60 between EU and Leba-
nese actors, privileging the impact of social 
learning on policy instruments. Much has 
been written on how socialization into 
Western values occurs between elites of 
the less democratized entity and the EU. 61 
But the reverse trajectory remains underex-
plored. Examining interactions between EU 
officials and Lebanese actors and exploring 
how the former become socialized into the 
particularities of the Lebanese political sys-
tem and shape their policy responses may 
inform the debate on ways to revitalize EU 
strategy in Lebanon. Concrete outputs of 
such studies would be to identify how the 
EU could couple its approach with strate-
gies incentivizing elite coalescence. 
 This article cautiously suggests that 
restructured EU engagement in Lebanon 
should take into account the lessons learned 
from its involvement in divided societies. 
The broad DA toolkit that it applies across 
the Arab world does not provide enough of 
a differentiated lens to adequately address 
the dual goal of conflict regulation and 
democratization in Lebanon.
THE EU AND POLITICAL 
GOVERNANCE 
 The legacy of EU involvement in 
Lebanon has both academic and policy im-
plications for its broader support for transi-
tions in Arab societies. The breakdown 
of longstanding autocracies has taken the 
lid off Arab societies divided along eth-
nosectarian and ideological lines. There is 
increasing academic interest in revisiting 
how power-sharing settlements can pro-
vide a democratic design for Arab societies 
seeking to accommodate sectarian rifts, 
and whether Lebanon’s model holds les-
sons for its neighbors.62 Such settlements 
pose challenges to international actors like 
the EU. Their role in mediation is not only 
contested; efforts to simultaneously advo-
cate for democratic reforms and stability 
can create dilemmas.63 
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lights the pitfalls of politicizing sectarian-
ism through the bolstering or isolating of 
certain actors. 
 Most important, the EU experience 
in Lebanon shows that a “prescription for 
democratization”64 relying on procedural 
criteria has limitations when it comes to 
supporting transitions in ethnoreligious 
polities. Such criteria fail to tackle the 
complex ways through which sectarian and 
socioeconomic cleavages acquire political 
salience. Refraining from conceptualizing 
democracy assistance mainly in terms of 
procedural criteria and opening up to dif-
ferentiated understandings of democracy 
could benefit the EU in its approach to this 
changing region. 65
 A challenge for EU engagement in the 
region will be whether it can hone its DA 
approach to address sectarian and political 
fragmentation in countries such as Syria, 
Egypt and Libya. Support for the design 
of governance structures that mends rifts 
among political communities will have a 
major impact on democratization bench-
marks. 
 Despite its marginal role in the 2011 
Arab protest wave, Lebanon presents a 
key opportunity to understand the dynam-
ics underlying sectarian governance and 
alternative models of democracy. The 
small polity provides a benchmark case for 
assessing external assistance in a complex 
terrain of pluralistic politics. It also high-
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